Russia's war against Ukraine in 2022 and the war in 2026 are two completely different wars. The first relied on the sheer strength of the Ukrainian people's spirit and, let's be honest, old principles of management and warfare.
Russia's war against Ukraine in 2022 and the war in 2026 are two completely different wars. The first relied on the sheer strength of the Ukrainian people's spirit and, let's be honest, old principles of management and warfare.
At his press conference, Mykhailo Fedorov noted that in 2022, Oleksandr Syrsky actually saved the country by successfully designing and conducting the Kyiv Defense Operation. And at that time it was really effective. But it seems that times have changed. And here's why.
At the beginning of the invasion, Russia relied on the classics of the Soviet school: rapid tank breakthroughs and multi-kilometer columns of armored vehicles advancing on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. The main task of our forces was simply to stop this iron flow.
And it was here that the technologies of the first stage played a decisive role:
Javelin and NLAW: In the first few weeks alone, they burned hundreds of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The Russians lost millions of dollars worth of equipment from a $200,000 missile. This nullified the Russian offensive in the North.
Bayraktar TB2: The first legendary drones methodically destroyed logistics - refueling columns, railway trains with fuel, and command posts.
In four years, modern warfare has changed beyond recognition. First of all, the very philosophy of management has changed. As Fedorov says, today it is a network-centric war, built on the best electronic system, born directly among the Ukrainian military — "Delta", which reliably operates in a secure cloud.
It got to the point that the army even had its own digital currency — e-points.
Units earn it for destroying enemy equipment and manpower, and then spend it on a special military marketplace for new drones and weapons. Complete decentralization and efficiency incentives.
Drones themselves have become the main weapon of destruction at all distances:
FPV - shoot down the enemy at close range;
Middlestrikes - nightmare for the nearest rear;
Deepstrikes fly deep into the territory of the Russian Federation, bringing the war to its soil.
The course of war has become so dynamic that the technological rules of the game are being rewritten every month. This is a real sentence for the old bureaucratic system, accustomed to long defense contracts. What was super technology today, no longer works tomorrow.
“Certain things in technology change 20–30 times per year,” states Fedorov.
Whoever reacts to these changes the fastest will dominate.
It's hard for the old generals - they're not used to it.
It's hard for business - the market wants long-term and stable contracts, no one wants to lose money due to sudden cancellation of orders when the technology is outdated.
But business interests are not an end in themselves here. The needs of war come first.
And the numbers show that since the beginning of 2026, Fedorov has managed to set this Internet machine of the military economy ablaze. We have proven to be much more maneuverable than the enemy. Russia is autocratic, decisions are made in one center and they trickle down for a long time. They are simply not capable of quickly deploying such a machine.
Statistics for the second quarter of 2026 show an impressive trend. According to Forbes, Russia began to lose 440 soldiers per square kilometer . This is three times more than in the first quarter and five times more than at the end of 2025.
At the same time, according to Fedorov's slides, the Russians are managing to seize less and less land. The advantage has shifted to the Armed Forces of Ukraine: we have begun to liberate more than we have given away.
This kind of math makes waging war for the Russian Federation completely unprofitable from a financial point of view. Let's do the math:
One year of war by one soldier (if he is alive and wounded) costs the Russian budget approximately $60,000 - $70,000 (pay, logistics, food, ammunition).
If a soldier dies, the one-time "price of death" for the Russian budget increases sharply and amounts to about $130,000 - $150,000 in compensation to the family.
As a result, 1 sq. km of our land costs Russia approximately $61.6 million (and this is only in human losses, without taking into account burned equipment, missiles, and logistics!).
To understand the absurdity of these numbers:
For $61.6 million in Ukraine, you can buy approximately 300 sq. km of agricultural land. This is the area of the entire principality of Liechtenstein — with all its cities, fields, and mountains!
The area of Kyiv region is 28,131 sq. km.
If we count “head-on”: to occupy only the Kyiv region at this price, Russia would need to deploy 12.4 million soldiers (wait a minute, that’s the population of Moscow!).
In “soldier dollars,” this would cost $1.73 trillion. Given that the entire Russian budget for 2025 was about $400 billion, the Russians would have to burn through more than four of their annual budgets in human terms to conquer a territory the size of the Kyiv region.
While Russia is flooding the front with expensive "meat", Ukraine's goal is to minimize its own losses at the expense of iron.
"Last year, we managed to contract 12 thousand ground robotic complexes (GRC), against which there were a lot of people. But the political decision is to move on. This year, 50 thousand GRCs will be purchased, everything that is possible is being bought," Fedorov emphasizes.
The mathematics of life is also obvious here:
Providing one soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine costs the budget $30,000 per year (excluding the cost of weapons).
Mobile autonomous kamikazes cost several thousand dollars.
Every robot on the battlefield not only saves public funds, it saves the lives of our soldiers - the most valuable and priceless thing. More IRCs and drones - fewer our losses.
Even if Russia conducts another large-scale mobilization in the fall, but continues to lose to us technologically, we have a good chance. However, for this to happen, it is critically important for us to maintain a technological advantage.
And technologies do not tolerate closed ecosystems and bureaucratic comfort. They need a free market, competition, and instant implementation. This is exactly what the Ministry of Digital Affairs team tried to build.
And this is the advantage that we risk instantly losing if the "old school" people take up the cause again. Even if we increase mobilization and cancel all postponements, this war cannot be won with "meat" - the enemy simply has more of it.
This war can only be won with technology. And that is our only real chance.
