Shaheds with Ukrainian 4G cards on board fly to us even without GPS and are guided by Telegram bots. Did The Economist write the truth?
Russian shaheeds are using Ukrainian mobile operator networks and Telegram bots to command and control flights over Ukraine. The scheme seems as simple as a door, and the question arises whether it is really possible.
Russian shaheeds are using Ukrainian mobile operator networks and Telegram bots to command and control flights over Ukraine. The scheme seems as simple as a door, and the question arises whether it is really possible.
Context
As The Economist reported, a team of Ukrainian engineers recently discovered a note inside one of the drones they were dismantling — likely left by a sympathetic Russian engineer — that hinted at a new control algorithm. The note notes that the drones are controlled by bots on the social network Telegram, which send flight data and real-time video to human operators. And because drones no longer use GPS navigation (instead, they fly by cell towers), jamming the radio signal is no longer useful.
Comments
This unexpected version of Russian drone control, voiced by Western journalists, was picked up by Ukrainian experts.
«Russian shaheeds do not control their flights via Telegram and do not send video broadcasts anywhere via Ukrainian mobile networks,» he emphasized.
According to him, the only thing that really corresponds to reality is the presence of trackers with SIM cards on some drones, which transmit basic telemetry: coordinates, speed and flight altitude via mobile communication to a Telegram bot. SIM cards can be Ukrainian, Russian or international, and they are found in large numbers in the wreckage.
However, MP Oleksandr Fedienko sees a much bigger problem in this. As he wrote in his post, Russian drones can indeed be equipped with a plastic SIM card, e-SIM, or a soft SIM card from mobile operators.
«Using this kit, they can already fly using A-GPS,» he emphasized.
A-GPS or Assisted GPS technology is an auxiliary technology that helps determine the location of the subscriber using terrestrial mobile stations (in conditions where it is impossible to establish an operational or reliable satellite connection). The most banal example: you are following the navigator, and suddenly you enter a tunnel. The satellite does not catch there, but if the antennas of mobile operators are installed, the location will be transmitted.
Thus, a Russian can buy a Ukrainian pre-paid SIM card without a passport and turn a shaheed into a striking weapon that does not depend, or at least not completely, on satellite signals. Although, as Serhiy Beskrestnov emphasizes, shaheeds still cannot do without satellite navigation signals, and electronic warfare still affects them.
What was said before?
This is not the first time that Sergey Beskrestnov, known as Sergey Flash, has commented on the presence of SIM cards in shaheeds. Back in November last year, he voiced the problem of Russian drones using mobile networks in an interview with Radio Liberty.
He emphasized then that the enemy is trying to find out what devices can be placed on the drone. For example, a Russian could try to screw an LTE modem onto the drone and insert a Ukrainian SIM card into it.
«Let him fly and try to film the air defense on camera. And this is a challenge, because we have to counteract it,» said Serhiy Flesh.
By the way, the first 4G modems were found in Russian drones back in 2023. That is, the problem is not new at all.
Old photo from 2023 with a Ukrainian SIM card on board
How to use Telegram
The Economist claims that with 4G modems on board, some drones can supposedly not only navigate the terrain, but also transmit certain information. Telegram bots can be used for this. Fedienko gives an example of a message that could come from a shaheed.
The link with the drone at the point, coordinates xxxxxx is lost
Host: shaheed 1
Host IP: xx xx xx xx
The problem occurred on 25.05.2025 at 19:59:37
Importance: Medium
Telegram bots collect such information during drone flights, process it, and can visualize it for the operator who manages facilities in Ukrainian airspace.
Is there any resistance?
In order to make it impossible for the suicide bombers to orient themselves on the ground, Ukrainian engineers, together with mobile operators, use the so-called spoofing of the digital field to confuse enemy drones. Thus, during attacks, Ukrainian smartphones suddenly find themselves in other regions and even countries. This has been noticed repeatedly by mobile subscribers.
But such tactics do not completely solve the problem of the enemy’s use of mobile networks.
«We cannot just make a decision, disconnect certain subscribers or crush all mobile frequencies with electronic warfare. This is a serious decision, so we have to maneuver here and try to be faster, more flexible,» Serhiy Flesh emphasized in 2024.
It is worth adding that Ukrainian drones can also use similar tactics to target the Russian territory. But sometimes the enemy uses more radical measures, completely turning off mobile networks or severely restricting their use. A striking example is the «failures» in the work of mobile networks in Moscow on the eve of the zombie parade. The townspeople were asked to «be patient a little.»
Oleksandr Fedienko adds in a conversation with dev.ua that a year ago they held many meetings with mobile operators. «On the basis of the Verkhovna Rada committee. But they don’t want to do anything. They are just sabotaging,» he emphasizes.
According to the MP, everything boils down to the fact that operators need to take some additional actions, «buy something, analyze something, and they say that this is not exactly their functionality.»
Fedienko does not call for radical actions. «You don’t need to immediately close Telegram and transfer SIM cards to passports. This will in no way solve the issue systematically. But turning off the same data transfer on operators' networks (during attacks — Ed.) is, I think, a matter of time…», he emphasizes.
UPD. Kyivstar press service comment:
«A SIM card of any mobile operator in Ukraine can be purchased freely, and the legislation does not limit the number of SIM cards purchased. Interference with electronic communications networks through subscriber SIM cards is completely excluded. At the same time, Kyivstar is constantly cooperating with the security and defense forces and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine in this area.»
We have written requests to representatives of mobile operators and are waiting for responses. The article will be updated.