Is it possible to «eavesdrop» on satellites and how secure is modern space communication? Software engineer Oleksandr Gromovsky explains why the era of easy WikiLeaks-style interceptions is over, and where the vulnerability actually lies
Is it possible to «eavesdrop» on satellites and how secure is modern space communication? Software engineer Oleksandr Gromovsky explains why the era of easy WikiLeaks-style interceptions is over, and where the vulnerability actually lies
After the high-profile WikiLeaks leaks of the time and against the backdrop of the rapid growth of the role of satellite systems during the war in Ukraine, the issue of space communication security is back in the spotlight. Satellites today provide not only navigation, but also guidance of high-precision weapons, allow you to see the battlefield in real time and serve as a channel for transmitting huge amounts of encrypted data.
But is it really possible to intercept these signals «from the ground» with equipment from an online store? How secure are modern data transmission channels?
We discussed these issues with Oleksandr Gromovsky, a Ukrainian engineer with a unique technical background: he processed satellite data arrays on graphics processors, and also created cryptographic algorithms for global media giants, including Harmonic. It was his developments that allowed us to accelerate data encryption processes by 18 times, setting a new performance bar in the industry. Today, Oleksandr applies his experience in «high loads» and aviation security, developing new generation onboard systems for Panasonic Avionics, and is one of the developers and author of scientific papers on Inpartool, a system that made it possible to perform ultra-complex engineering calculations hundreds of times faster thanks to the use of video cards.
Remember the WikiLeaks publications showing intercepted pagers and unprotected satellite broadcasts? This created the illusion that anyone could «listen to space.» However, the reality has changed. And according to Alexander, what we saw in the early leaks was from an era when satellite traffic was often in the open or with minimal encryption, because no one believed that an amateur could afford a «dish» of the required range.
«Today, this is a myth,» the engineer is confident. «Modern military and even commercial satellite communications (such as Starlink or government channels) are built on the principle of zero trust. Data is encrypted on the sender’s device and decrypted only at the final recipient. Intercepting a radio wave is the easiest part of the task. Getting content from it without keys is a mathematical wall that cannot be broken through.»
Today, radio amateurs and OSINT enthusiasts are actively using SDR (i.e. Software-Defined Radio) — software-defined radio systems. For more serious tasks, platforms such as USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) are used. A set of such a board with antennas costs approximately $1,000–1,500. In the world of professional radio intelligence, where complexes cost millions, this is really a pittance. It is tempting to think: can a device for the price of a new iPhone really «put» or listen to a military satellite?
Oleksandr Gromovsky, who has worked for many years on satellite data monitoring systems using GPUs, explains the difference between «seeing» and «understanding»:
«For a nominal $1,000, you buy yourself „digital ears.“ An SDR board allows you to see the signal spectrum, determine the type of modulation, and even understand that a satellite above you is active and transmitting. This is called SIGINT (electronic intelligence) — you record the very fact of activity. But expecting this board to decode the conversation of pilots or video from a drone is pointless. Also, despite the fact that almost all modern systems use more or less standard modulation algorithms (such as QPSK, QAM) and access schemes (TDMA/FDMA), which can be processed quite easily even on cheap SDR boards, there are still algorithms for more complex organization of signal multiplexing. For example, CiC (Carrier in Carrier), which, in combination with various modulations, can make monitoring practically impossible even at the level of radio signal processing.»
The basis of satellite channel security is cryptography. Symmetric algorithms (e.g. AES-256) are used to encrypt traffic and asymmetric algorithms are used to securely exchange keys.
Oleksandr Gromovsky, who, while working at GlobalLogic on the development of AES and DVB-CSA cryptographic libraries for Harmonic, was involved in the optimization of complex algorithms and data protection, emphasizes: in this area, speed is the main fuse.
«In satellite communications, as in any high-load system, speed is critically important,» he explains. «The data flow is huge, delays are unacceptable. That is why hardware encryption accelerators are used directly on satellite terminals and ground stations. Breaking the modern AES-256 encryption algorithm by brute force is a task that will take billions of years. Moreover, in modern systems, keys can change (rotate) several times per session. While a hacker with a powerful computer is trying to pick a key for one second of transmission, the system will have long been working on other keys.»
If cryptography is almost impossible to crack, then why do leaks still happen? The expert is convinced: we should definitely not look for vulnerabilities in space.
«The weakest link in any security system is the entry and exit point. The satellite may be perfectly protected, the radio channel encrypted. But if the ground control station runs on outdated software, if the administrator uses a weak password, or if the encryption keys are stored on an unsecured server, all the math is useless,» comments Oleksandr. «Most real breaches occur through compromise of ground infrastructure or social engineering, not through interception of the signal from orbit by USRP boards.»
Total monitoring of satellite systems, as shown in spy films, is today only available to states with enormous resources.
For Ukraine and the world, this means one thing: the security of communications depends not so much on whether the enemy «hears» the signal, but on compliance with cyber hygiene protocols. The technologies that engineers like Oleksandr Gromovsky are working on make data interception an extremely expensive and complex process, turning amateur monitoring from an effective weapon into an interesting but limited technical hobby.
