The Russian military has been able to increase the range at which an operator can control and receive video from attack drones to approximately 150–175 km. Last year, the capabilities of such systems were approximately half that.
The Russian military has been able to increase the range at which an operator can control and receive video from attack drones to approximately 150–175 km. Last year, the capabilities of such systems were approximately half that.
This is stated in a study by the Kyiv-based think tank KI Insights, which was published by the British defense publication Calibre Defence.
This is done using mesh networks. In them, the signal does not necessarily have to go directly from the operator to the drone. Ground stations, repeaters, and the UAVs themselves can transmit it to each other in a chain, thus gradually increasing the communication range. Thanks to this, the operator can maintain communication with the drone even when it is far from the nearest ground station.
KI Insights cites the example of July 17, when the Varyag unit piloted a Geranium during a strike on a gas condensate facility near Seleshchyna in Poltava Oblast. According to analysts, at that time the drone was approximately 125 km from Russian-controlled territory.
In addition, in early 2026, the Russians began equipping modified Molniya-2Ps with mesh modems, cameras, and on-board computers. In this configuration, Molniya can receive signals from other drones and transmit them further. That is, it turns into a flying repeater between a ground station and a drone that has flown much deeper into the Ukrainian rear.
A regular Molniya, according to the study authors, costs about $800–1200, and a version with mesh communication costs about $4000–5000. But this still allows for the use of relatively cheap UAVs as additional network nodes instead of much more expensive reconnaissance vehicles.
However, mesh networks have a weak point — video. The further away the drone is and the more intermediate nodes the signal passes through, the greater the delay can become. Therefore, this scheme is less suitable for very precise manual targeting of fast moving targets.
But for strikes on stationary objects, this is not so critical. That is why analysts link the development of such networks to Russian attacks on railway, fuel, energy and other logistical infrastructure in the Ukrainian rear.
Previously, dev.ua wrote that after the Starlink restriction, Sergey Beskrestnov (Flash) warned that the Russians may more actively return to mesh modems for controlling strike UAVs.
