The switch from UAnet is in the hands of the authorities. How can we not get to this point (or are we already there)?
I’ve wanted to write about this for a long time. I spent several months compiling a summary for this topic, studying various government regulations and delving into relatively recent initiatives.
As we all know, during war, the Ukrainian Internet is regulated differently. And this is primarily related to our security. But the new regulation sets new rules for the future. And some of them can be quite dangerous. In the wrong hands.
I’ve wanted to write about this for a long time. I spent several months compiling a summary for this topic, studying various government regulations and delving into relatively recent initiatives.
As we all know, during war, the Ukrainian Internet is regulated differently. And this is primarily related to our security. But the new regulation sets new rules for the future. And some of them can be quite dangerous. In the wrong hands.
The topic of blocking Internet resources in Ukraine is not raised often now. And by individual people. Recently, I have seen it actively discussed, for example, under the FB posts of People’s Deputy Oleksandr Fedienko or cyber expert (and white hat hacker) Sean Townsend.
This discussion boils down to one thing: in recent years, the state has gained a fairly significant lever in regulating the Ukrainian Internet. The intentions (in my opinion) are good. These levers are designed to block malicious sites: phishing (they steal our bank details), casinos (illegal providers), adult content, distribution of alcohol, medical drugs, tobacco (illegal sites), sites with Russian literature, sites with unauthorized (pirated video content), Russian and propaganda sites.
But the mechanisms for these levers are sometimes poorly defined. Experts mostly focus on technical/technological or legal vulnerabilities.
Before the war, we encountered mostly one type of blocking of sites in Ukraine — through a court decision. In world practice, this is the most transparent mechanism, which is usually agreed upon by all market participants. There are also nuances there. But at least the mechanism itself looks transparent to everyone.
How it all began
Since the beginning of Russia’s aggression and the annexation of Crimea, sanctions-based regulation of the Internet has also appeared. In 2017, Russian resources such as Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, social networks that had become one of the main sources of propaganda in Ukraine, left our lives forever. The blocking took place thanks to a presidential decree (Poroshenko). This was a precedent that had never been seen in the Ukrainian Internet before — large resources were blocked in one day.
But the initiative of the state leadership was well received by the majority of society, because the purpose of the blockade was clear.
I admit, back then, in May 2017, I didn’t believe that a website in Ukraine could be blocked using such a mechanism. “This can’t be happening. It’s unacceptable,” I sincerely said into the phone to a journalist friend who called me and asked for a comment. I hadn’t been reading the news for a while because I was on vacation, and the journalist called just after the plane landed at Boryspil airport. He caught me off guard :)
Of course, I was shocked then.
Why? Because I remembered how my journalist colleagues and I went to meetings of the NCCRI (the old name of the telecom regulator) to try to control whether the commission supported police initiatives to block websites without a court decision during the Yanukovych era.
Internet blocking was unacceptable to me. Under any guise. The Internet was conceived as a free, independent environment, I believed. Which is outside the system, outside governments. I liked this concept then. I like it now.
But.
Over time, I changed my principled and uncompromising attitude towards sudden Internet blocking. Yes, when you have an enemy nearby, there must be an effective mechanism for certain restrictions. But it is very important that it be transparent and understandable.
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has decided to almost completely block RUnet. This was also a quite logical step not only from the point of view of information security, but also economically. Russian sites should not make money on our market. Although I heard some indignation from some members of the Internet community at that time.
For example, the founder of I mena.ua and Mirofost, Oleksandr Olshansky, a man often called one of the fathers of Uanet, openly spoke out against total blocking in 2023. “ It is necessary to block specific sites, and preferably in one direction,”he said then, fearing that we were adopting the practice of mass blocking in the Russian Federation.
How blocking works now (a little practice)
In parallel, at the beginning of the large-scale operation, the special telecom network management center under the State Service for Special Communications (NSC) received much broader powers under martial law — to issue orders binding on all Ukrainian providers regarding the operational blocking of websites and domains.
Usually this happened like this: law enforcement officers or special services, for example, the SBU, contacted the National Security Service with a list of websites, and the National Security Service blocked them.
So far, I can state that the special services are trying not to abuse this mechanism. After all, we don’t hear about high-profile blockings of legal businesses or white, pro-Ukrainian media.
There were some, let’s say, interesting cases that were unlikely to have much impact on freedom of speech or the economy.
For example, in 2025, the National Center for the Study of the Law on the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities blockedthe Antikor website, and then the court ordered it to be unblocked (I am not defending Antikor here, perhaps it would have blocked it itself, had it had such a legal opportunity:); I am simply stating a fact).
Perhaps by chance, in April of this year, the add.ua website, which belongs to the "Good Day Pharmacy" chain, was blocked. A month later, it had to be unblocked.
It is also known that the National Crime Agency, at the request of the Security Service of Ukraine, also blocks online bookstores that carry Russian literature. Often, this is indeed a case of hidden sales of such books.
"It is interesting that on bookshop.in.ua, the country of publication was indicated as Lithuania in the cards of most books by Russian authors, and among the new products, "War and Peace" by Leo Tolstoy was sold without information about the publisher," noted representatives of the specialized initiative that deals with blocking statistics, UABlockList.
But sometimes we (dev.ua) investigated some cases that, in our opinion, looked quite ambiguous. For example, in 2025, the National Center for Cybercrime blocked access to the website of the Knyzhkova Khata store in the city of Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk region.
This is a small shop in the city center, which has been operating there since 1985. And the news really surprised us: what kind of Russian literature is there in Kolomyia?
As it turned out, the owner of the bookstore, an elderly man (70 years old), had not cleaned the site’s archive since the 2000s, and there are indeed Russian books there, but they have not been sold for a long time.
“In 2021, my son and his family moved to the USA. Since then, I have been managing the site, but I don’t know how to remove those books from there,” the owner told us at the time.
Could he have lied to us? Yes, he could. But for some reason, somewhere on a subconscious level, I believe him.
So oddities in blocking sometimes occur. But, I repeat, they are not massive. And so far, the services are compiling blocking lists quite carefully (in my opinion).
The problem is different.
Who prepares the blocking lists?
Firstly, the number of bodies that will be granted the right to submit such lists is increasing (and there are already too many). We already know that, in addition to law enforcement agencies and special services, propaganda and pirate sites are submitted for blocking by the National Television Council. Sites with illegal casinos are also submitted by Playcity.
It recently became known that the Tax Service has already received the right to block some resources. Starting in the new year, online sellers of alcohol, tobacco products, and electronic cigarettes that are not included in the State Tax Service register will be banned .
It’s good that the State Tax Service is taking care of the problems of the white market. But it’s not very good that it is completely unknown by what mechanism the blocking will be carried out. If, for example, by IP address, won’t this cause the downfall of other resources that are in no way related to tobacco and that also use it? The legislators simply did not prescribe this mechanism. Have they forgotten? But this can really turn into a technical problem — when there are no regulations on how to implement blocking and careless steps harm Internet business.
After all, it seems that we do not have a single competent body in our country that would be responsible for the presence of grounds for blocking, as well as for the technical correctness of the blocking. The National Control Center is the executor. It gives blocking decisions already agreed upon by someone to providers. It would be nice if all these lists were checked by an independent regulator (which would bear specific and full responsibility for each individual blocking). As MP Oleksandr Fedienko rightly noted, in my opinion, sometimes lists are submitted to regulators (the National Council, the National Commission for the Protection of the Environment) by private/public structures. For example, the “Clear Sky” initiative submits pirated and copyright-infringing sites to the National Council for blocking.
The initiative is really useful. And its systematization of violations over many years is invaluable. But a fair question: does the National Council check every violation on the list? If not, who is legally responsible for the reason for the blocking?
I’ll note: I’m not defending pirated sites here. I’m drawing attention to the blocking mechanism itself. In my opinion, it’s imperfect. And it seems that no one particularly cares about this issue. Well, except for some people, fanatics, like me.
"I am categorically against any blocking at the level of operator networks. Information should be blocked on the sites where it is posted," Fedienko wrote in October.
This sounds quite reasonable, in my opinion. Another question is whether the state is currently able to create such a clear and precise mechanism when content (or part of it) is blocked on the site itself.
The paradox with Polymarket
For example, Playcity (through NKEK) recently blocked Polymarket at the domain level — through Ukrainian providers. This is an American crypto prediction platform where users can place bets on future events: sports matches, economic indicators, weather phenomena, award ceremony results, political and legislative events, as well as military conflicts. Well, I think you already know this without me.
The fact is that Polymarket produces really interesting content. And from the point of view of forecasts, it has a certain value for certain people. But the regulator blocked it on the principle of similarity to a casino (although on Polymarket bets are made not between the service and the user, but between the players themselves). Could it have been done differently?
In my opinion, yes. There are not many such large betting sites in the world. And it was possible to try to negotiate with him so that he would not accept bets from Ukrainians (or somehow limit them). But just take and block the domain, right? Another question immediately arises? Why? Is Polymarket really creating gambling addiction in Ukraine? And who will be responsible for this?
After all, there is still no clear mechanism for accountability for blocking, although the State Service for Special Communications continues to cement its rights.
Anti-fraud or a ready-made switch?
Thus, in October, the National Center for Cybercrime updated the regulations for the national phishing domain filtering system. The corresponding order obliged all Internet providers to register in a special website filtering system within 30 days (until November 16).
What does it all mean? This is a special system that was created to protect Ukrainians from financial fraud — fake websites of banks, government agencies and payment services. When specialists from the National Bank’s cyber center (another player in the "blocking market") receive a complaint about a phishing site, they check it within 2 hours! during working hours! and enter the domain into a special database. Then within 15 minutes!!! Ukrainian providers automatically start redirecting users from a dangerous (in the opinion of the National Bank) site to a state warning page. In fact, they block their work.
Why is this a concern? Despite the noble goal of protecting against fraudsters, this architecture creates a number of risks for legitimate website and digital rights owners. First, the decision to block is made manually without a court order, and the list of blocked domains is not public — the public and journalists cannot control whether legitimate resources have been included.
Although the regulations explicitly prohibit using this system to combat propaganda or sanctioned sites, technically the state receives a ready-made centralized tool that, if desired, allows it to "disable" any domain in the Ukrainian segment of the network in 15 minutes.
Note: DNS filtering (the mechanism used) cannot block individual URLs — only the entire domain. So if hackers hack one page on a large news site or forum and post phishing there, the entire portal will be blocked in a couple of hours.
Sean Townsend has already criticized this order. He believes that its implementation will lead to large-scale service failures, kinetic strikes after leaks from the State Special Communications Service, political censorship, market redistribution and corruption, and in general, a broken network.
I won’t be so categorical. But I will say this thesis: even a useful tool can become a switch in the hands of people with bad intentions. And for this, the system must be cut out in such a way that it cannot be undermined. Legally and technically.
And this, first of all, should be ensured at the level of preparation and adoption of laws. The same Playcity has at its disposal the economic tool of blocking almost any small or medium-sized Internet media (through a huge fine of 5 million UAH for mentioning the brand of a legal casino) just because it uses such a loophole as the inadequacy of unfinished (or intentionally unfinished) laws.
I have repeatedly raised this issue (the existence of such laws is a path to censorship), but it seems that the state bodies (and deputies) are already satisfied with everything.
And you?
Meanwhile, the state is already preparing the groundwork for how the current system of blocking sites will work after the war. For example, a draft law was recently submitted to the telecom regulator for approval, which states that the scheme with orders to block sites will work for another six months after the end of hostilities. The initiative is aimed, first of all, at combating terrorism. But some questions certainly arise about it.
There is a saying: “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.” Sometimes it is really true. And we need to be careful. After all, we all still have to use this Internet, both now and after the possible end of the war.
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